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ABSTRACT
Capitalization Effect Due to Proper t y
Tax Differentials
by
Paul F. McNutt, Master of Science
Utah State University , 1977
or Professor : Dr. IV. Cri s Lewis
Department: Economics

~laj

The capita l ization effect of property tax differentials for the four
market quarters in 1976 was studied in the Lo ga n, Utah market area.

A

secondary aspect of the s tudy was to assess th e variations in the assessed
to market value ratio.
10 7 observed sales were used for the data se t.

Age of struct ure ,

square feet in structure, quality of neighborhood, and property tax were
noted for each property sold.
From the regression a nal ysis i t was found tha t th ere was a significant capita l ization of the tax differentials.

The r esults indica te that

a one-percen t change in th e property t ax will result in a 0 . 4 percent
change in property value.
r atio .

Al so observed was th e ass essed to market value

Results indicate that the actual ratio is about 12.5 percent not

20 percent , as is required by state lm<.

The range in the ratio was

from about 4 pe rcent t o 20 pe r cent.

(71 pages)
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INTRODUCTION
Review of the Property Tax
The property tax, yielding over $47 billion in 1973, maintains its
position as the major source of revenue for most local governments .
Property taxation is not used by the federal government, and the few
states that have such a tax do not depend on it heavily.

I t is estimated

that more than 82,000 local governments rely at l east partially on the
property tax .
and tax rate .

Each of these localities has its own distinct tax base
1

The property tax general l y applies to real property which includes
land and buildings and, in most states, machinery and business inventories.

In most cases, it does not include tangible personal property

(except for machinery and inventory) or intangible personal property .
Table 1 shows the change from 1956 to 1973 in assessed value and
also the heavy reliance on rea l property.

Reliance on personal property

dropped from 18.7 percent to 13 . 4 percent during that 17-year span,
while dependence on real pToperty rose from 81. 3 percent to 86 . 6 percent.
In four states, Hawaii, Delaware, Pennsylvania, and New York, tangible
personal property are exempt from the property tax.

The most important

part of the personal property tax is the commercia l and industrial
1
The tax base is the percent of market value that is taxed (or the
assessed value). The tax rate is the percent of the base taken for
taxes (or the mill levy) .

2

property tax.

This property inc l udes machinery , equipment., and inventory.

As of 1973, 47 s t a t es had legal provisio ns t.o t ax s uch property .

Intan-

gible personal property is t axed in only 15 states , and the portion of
total assessed personal property i n these s t a t es is insignificantly sma ll.

TABLE l. --As sessed Value by Property Type , 1956 and 19 73
Assessed Val uea
(B illions)
Type of Property

Pe rc entage Of
To1:a l

1956

1973

1956

1973

209.8

704.6

81.3

86.6

Personal c

48.3

108. 7

18.7

13. 4

TOTAL

258.0

813.2

100.0

100.0

3

The value before exemptions.

bThe most import ant category is residential (nonfarm)
property.
cThe most importan t category is commercial and indus tri a l
t angible property .
Source:

Iaxwell a nd Aronson, 19 77, p. 14 3.

Table 2 provides a more detail ed breakdow n of r ea l a nd personal
l ocal prop e rty tax collec tion s for 1972.

Nonfarm r eside nti al real es t ate

paid th e largest share , over 19 billion, l<hich

~<as

47 . 3 percen t of total

r evenues collec t ed .
The amount of revenue collected by different s tate and local governmen t differs from state to stat e , a l so from one locality to th e nex t.

3

TABLE 2 .--Estimated Local Property Tax Collections by Source,
1972
Amount
(millions)

Source

Percentage
Distribution

NONBUSINESS
Nonfa1n residential realty
Farm rea lty
Vacant lots

a

TOTAL nonbusiness realty
Nonfarm personalty
Farm personalty
TOTAL nonbusiness personalty

$19,023
817
320

47.3
2.0
0.8

$20, 160

50.1

657
11 3

1.6
0.3

_EZQ_

1.9

$20,930

52.1

$1 ' 860
480

4.6
1. 2

~

22.8

$11,510

28.6

454
~
$4,741

l.l
10. 1

Public utilities

$3,019

7.5

TOTAL BUSINESS

$19,270

47.9

$40, zoob

100.0

TOTAL

NO~BUSINESS

BUSINESS
Farm realty
Vacant lots
Other realty
TOTAL business realty
Farm persona lty
Other personalty
TOTAL business personalty

TOTAL

11.8

alncludes both single-family dwelling units and apartments. An
es t imated $14 bi llio n, or 36 percent of a ll local property taxes,
was derived from single-family houses; about $5 billion or 12
percent of property tax revenue came from mu lt ifami l y units.
bThis is the es timated grand total for local property tax
receipts. In addition, there is an estimated $1.3 bill ion in
state propert y t axes . The data needed for a similar distribution
of state receipts a r e not avai l able .
Source:

Harriss, 1974, p. 15.
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For example, t he highest percentages of total revenues co ll ected from
t he property tax are in New Hampshire, New Jersey, and South Dakota with
58, 56, and 54 percent, respectively.

At the opposite extreme

Alabama

on l y derives 14 percent of state and l ocal revenues from the pr operty
tax.

Table 3 shows , by states, the property tax per capita, per $1 , 000

of pe rsonal income, and as a percent of state and loca l taxes.
Not only do total taxes and t axes per capita vary among sta t es, but
also the ratio of assessed va lue to market va lue also differs from state
to sta t e .

Table 4· gives the number of states that have assessment to

market val ue r atios in a given category .

2

For the most recent year

listed, 19 71 , five of the states had assessments as nine percent or l ess
of the market va lue .

At the opposite extreme, three states had ass ess -

ments that were greater th an 70 percent of the market va lu e .

Th e national

average in 1971 was 32.7 percent compared to 32 . 8 percent in 1966 and
30 percent in 195 6 .

Assessment t o market value ratios for each state are

given in Tab le 5.
Table 6 bri ngs out another important variation be tween state and
l oca l us es of the property tax .

Inequalities are created within and

between communities due to th e nonuniformity in the assessed to market
value ratios.
a communit y.

The intra-area dispersion describes the variati on within
The interarea dispersio n describes the variation between

communiti es in the assessment to market va lue ratio.

A lm; coefficient

2This ratio is simply the assesse d value divided by the sel ling
pric e . For example, if a prop erty ha s a market value of $50,000 and
has an assessed val ue of $10,000, the assessment to sal es ratio would
be 20 percent.

5

TABLE 3.--State a nd Local Property Tax Collections by St ate,
Fiscal Year 1972

State

Prop er ty Taxes
Per Cap 1tn

Property Taxes
Per $ 1 ,000 of
l' c r son::t l In come

$ 202

$49

39

43
I 07
196

14
23

14
23

52
25
71

39
24
48

U. 5. Average
Alabama

Al:1ska
,\rizon:~

Ark1n s :1s

7S
327

California
Col orado
Conncct j cut
Delawar e
F l orida

1-1 3

GCOTJ:i:l

120

llawa i i
Idaho
J lllnois
lnd1ana
l ow a

237

27

43

225
7·1
77
204

Loui s i o1na

I 75

J .1nt1

21
38
3·1

121

220

f.!:1 i n c

51
62

1-12

229

Kansas
Kentucky

~ l ary

201
308
99

so

55
59
54
23

24
61

Propcr t }' Tax es
as Percent of
Stat e- Local Taxe s

41

49
17
33
31
19

35
41
50

46
49
21
18

43

39

32

324

71

51

Mi chi J!i.n
t·:inncsota
/Hc;sissipfu

223

39

40

78

51
58
28

i·lt ssouri
Hon t ana
Nebraska
Nevadil
New ll;unpsh i rc
Nc\., Jersey
New Mexico
New York
North Coiro I ina

J ~s
257
228
2 10

40
72
57
45

50
50

2·18

66
65

Massachu st~

tts

Nor th Dakota
Ohio

m.. L:Jhoma
Orcr,on

PC'nnsy l v:mia
Rhode Is 1and
South Carol i n.:1
South Dakota
Tennessee
Texas

Ut:-th

232

3 10

86
290
94
177
I SO
100

Vennont

43

79
248
94
14 7

27
48
28
39
23

73
Z9
40

193
82

Wyoming

258
2S2

01strict of Col1lr.1bia

I S9

lb rri ss , l97t1 , p.

37

25
41

29
57
35
49

~J 1 scans

Source :

58

43

h':tshjnr,ton
h't.:s t Vi rgj ni n

in

so

35
56
21

223
1-15
201

149
215
11 8

Virg inia

27
58
28

23
37

1 ~.

25

54
27

44
60
31
47
25

38
35
38
28
36
21

67

43

65
32

49
31

6

TABLE 4. --Distribution of S ates by Ratios of Assessed Value
to Sales Price of Real PropeTty, 1956, 1966, and 1971

Assessments as a
Percentage of Sales
0-9
10-19
20-29
30-39
40-49
50-59
60-69
Over 70

Number of States
1956
2
16
16
4
7
2
1
0

Average Percentage

30.0

aincludes the District of Columbia .
Source :

~laxwell

a nd Aronson, 1977, p. 146 .

1966
1

17
10
7
6a
6
2
32 . 8

1971
5
11
9
10

ga

4
1
3
32.7

7

TABLE 5.--Percentage of Assessed Value to Sales
Price of Sold Properties, Single-Family Nonfarm
Houses, Se l ec t e d States , 1971
Ratio
(percen t )

State
United States :
~lean

~ledi an

Oregon
Kentuck y
Ne1; Jersey
~lassachusetts

Di strict of Columbia
Wisconsin

34.0
32.6

87 . 1
83.8

58.3
49.3
47 . 5
46.7

~lichigan

41.5

Illinois
Ohio
Wa s hington
Virginia

37.8
36.9

Tennessee

32 . 6
26.6
25.8
23.5
20.7
20.0
18.2
18.0
15 . I
13 .1
8.5
4.0

Pennsyl vania
Ne1; York
Indiana
Colorado
Californ i a
Oklahoma
Texas
North Dakota
Loui siana
Minnesota
South Carolina
Source:

Harris s, 19 74 , p. 28.

36.1
34.8

8

TABLE 6.--Assessment Uniformity, Single-Family Nonfarm Houses, Selected
States, 1971
Coefficient of Interarea
Dispersion

Composite Coefficient of Int raArea Dispersion
State
United

Percent
States-~ledian

Kentucky
mchi ga n
New Hampshire
California
Oregon
New Jersey
Hawaii
Florida
~ la ssnc hu setts

Ohio
Vermont
Tennessee
~linnesota

North Carolina
Illino is
Indiana
Georgia
lvashington
Ari zona
Louisiana
Texas
\Ve st Virginia
~li ss ouri

New York
South Carolina
Alabama
Penn sy lvania
Source:

State

Percent

22 . 5

United States-Median

12. 5

Utah
Iowa

4

~lary1and

5
5
8
8

14.6

14

5

15.0
15.7
16.5
16 . 9
17 . 2
18.1
18.2
19.5
21. 2
21.4
22.2
22.5
23.0
23.1
23.6
23.9

New Jersey
Washington
North Carolina

24.7

~I aine

24

25.1
25.7
25.7
26 . 5
26.8

ll'isconsin
South Carolina
Al abama
Pennsylvania
New York

27.9

~ l ississippi

28. 1
30.0

~1assachusetts

24
25
26
26
32
33
40
42

Harriss, 1974 , p. 30.

Oregon
California
Ohio
Kentucky
Colorado
IUinois
Michigan
Kansas
De l a~<are

~li nnesota

Connecticut
~1issouri

Lo uisiana

9

10
10
11
13
14
14

16
17
21
21
22

9

indi cates relative uniformity within or between communities.
selected states listed, Utah had the

lo~<est

For the

coefficient of interarea

dispersion; the coefficient was only four compared to the United States '
median of 14.

The interarea variations have equity implications when

applied to a state property tax .

In Utah, the state collects revenue

from the communities and then returns the revenue on a per capita (student) basis to the local school districts.
this tax, a community

~<ith

Given a set mill levy for

an assessed to market value of 10 percent

would be paying less than a community with a 20 percent ratio.
Differences in the property tax from locality to locality, in most
cases, are due to fiscal choice.

The amount of revenue and hO\; the rev-

enue is derived are choices that each community makes.

I n some instances ,

ho1;ever , these decisions are made on the state l eve l and govern local
choice .

For example, the state of Utah dictates that all assessment to

market va lue ratios must be 20 percent.

3

Advantages and Disadvantages of the Property Tax
Harriss (1974) offers an overvim; of the advantages and disadvantages
of the property tax system .

The positive features include :

local taxes

are spent on local goods; the consumer of local goods can choose bet1;een
communi ties for the community which best meets his demands;

4

genera ll y,

those who pay the tax receive the services; and to the extent th e tax is

3Actual assessment to market value ratios in Logan, Utah are discussed in Chapter IV.
4The Tiebout hypothesis rests on this assumption, and it is discussed in Chapter II .

10

cap itali:ed in t o lm;er market price, it is no real burden on future
consumers.

5

That local taxes are expend ed to provide services to lo cal residents
is consiJered a favorable featu r e of the tax because it allows the consumers choice .
utilit y .

lVith thi s choi ce consumers will better maximize his ow n

Th:1t those wh o pay nl so rece ive the be nefits is considered to

be advantageous since it too helps consumers best maximize their utility .
The capitalization feature of the property tax limits the future burden
of the tax.

With the limiting of the future burd en socially optimal

allocation of that resource can better be met.
Among the negative aspects are the following:

resource al lo catio n

is distorted (a lthough thi s is c haracterist ic of any tax ) ; the tax i s
often regressive, thus, violating the co ncept of vertical equity; and as
administrated in most localiti es, it violates the concept of horizontal
equity.

Resources are misallocated even though part of the tax is

capitalized.

As is discussed in more depth in the next section,

capitalization is nearly complete o n land with a n in e lastic supply function a nd very slight on capital goods with an elas tic supply function.
Thu s, the part of the tax that is on capital goods (equipm ent, inventory,
and other personal goods) is s hift e d o nto th e consumer and dis t or t s his
dec isions .

It has been hypothesized that a poorer person spends a

greater percentage of his permanent income on housi ng than does a richer
person.

Thus, the tax is regressive relative to income which must be

considered an unfavorable aspect of the tax.

The other criticis m, that

5
Thi s con c ept of capitali zation will be further discussed in the
next part of this chapter.

11

of i ts present manner of administration, is due mainly to the inconsis tencies in the assessment process.

Thi s mainly relates back to the

assessment to market value ratio discussed above.

Accordin g to the con -

cept of horizontal equity, equals should be treated equally.

When two

pieces of property of equal value are assess ed at significantly differ ent amounts, equa ls are not being treated equally.
the administration of the tax are:

Other criticisms of

payments are due in lump sums once

or twice a year, this can be a great burden to some individuals; and,
the appeals system is oft en so costly that only the rich have the
resources to afford an effective appea l hearing.
Harriss (1974) , Beck er (1969) , Lynn (1969), Rasmussen (1959), Ladd
(1973), and others who have studied property taxes and their economic
effects have sugges t ed t he following reforms:

centralization an d pro-

fessiona li zation of the assessment process; adjustments of the base and
rate (e.g., minimizing tax exemptio ns and switching from hi gh tax rates
on manmade capital and low rates on land to low rates on manmade capi t a l
and high rates on land) ; and relief for special hardship 'cases (e . g. ,
aged and/or poor persons).
Central i zation and professionalizing of th e administration of the
property tax, part icularly th e assessment process, is a step t01;ard
correcting assessment inequities.

Currently, properties of equal value

often have different assessed va lu es and, thus, different taxes; this
vio l a t es the principle of horizontal equity.

t~os t

localities cannot

afford or fail to obta in professiona l staffing to utilize modern computer systems or to provide effec tive means for appeal.

By cent ra lizing

the administration of the tax (e. g. state contro l), many of these goa ls
could be efficiently fi nanced .

12

HOI< ever, with state control there are several disadvantages.

There

is a loss of the local autonomy, which is a positive feature of the tax.
In addi tion, there would be a tendency for communities to adopt similar
fiscal policies, thus, reducing the range of consumer choice.

Although

these criticisms have merit, it is also true t hat most proposed state
controls would be limited to the assessment process and not the decision
on the tax rate to be used.

Thus, if a community wanes little or no

revenue from the property tax, it needs only to lo1,er its mill levy.
Adjustment:s in the property tax base and rate would help alleviat:e
many of the resource allocation problems caused by the tax.

In partic-

ular, minimizing tax exemptions and c hanging the emphasis from a tax on
manmade capita l to a heavier tax o n l and would be effective changes.

l~ith

the increasing numb ers of exemptions, t he rates must be increased to
obtain the same amoun t of revenue.

Thi s means higher t axes for nonexempt

property.
The other reform, shifting of the tax from manmade capital to land,
would limit the misallocation of manmade capital.

Current:ly, ••ith high

tax rates on structures and machinery, there is a tendency to avoid
improvements , utilize obsolete machinery, and build structures sma ller
than optima l.

Give n the lowe r rates on land, there is a tendency to

maximize the use of land while minimizing t he us e of capital, adding to
the pressure for urban sprawl and central city decay.

lvith a rever sal

of this tax situation, use of manmade capita l would be closer to op imal
and land would be used more intensively.

If land is fixed in supply, a

tax, high or low , will have no effect on the quantity produced; it will
only effect the amount of rent derived from the land.

l3

The final reform measure, adoption of relief of hardship cases,
would reduce part of the regressivity in the propert y tax.

The tax is

regressive because, in general, low income individuals spend a larger
percentage of his disposable income on property taxes than does his
high income counterpart .

By a l l owi ng for some tax relief for the poor

and aged, the tax system would be more equitable.
The Incid ence of the Propertv Tax
Shi fti ng of property taxes, as with a ll taxes, is dependent on the
elasticities of the supply and demand functions.
of demand

(~)

Th e price elastici t y

is defined as the perce ntage change in quantity (Q) due

to a unit percent change in pr ice (P) . 6

Th e dema nd elasticity can be

written as :
~

l1Q
l1P

p

Q

TI1e demand for a commodity is el astic if the ela sticity is greater than
one.

It is inelas t ic if the elasticity is J ess th an one and unitary

elasticity if the elas t icity of demand is equal to one.
Figure I shm;s a relatively elastic demand function (D) and a r ela tively in e l astic dem an d fun ction (D , ) .

A price change from P to P
1
0

would result in a smal l change in quantity demanded from Q to Q1 , with
0
the relatively inelastic demand function . However, with the relative l y
elastic demand func tion (D), the same chan\!e in price would result in a
r el atively l arge change i n quantity demanded, from Q t o Q .
2
0
6 For example, if a one percent decrease i n price results in a two
percent increase i n t he quantity demanded, the demand elasticity is two.

14

0

0

Fig . l. Pr ic e quantity combi nations f or demand functions
having different elasticities.

15

Like demand elasticity, elasticity of supply (E) is defined as the
percentage change in quantity supplied due to a one percent cha nge in
price .

7

~lathematically,

supply elasticity is l<ritten:

Figure 2 shows a relativel y elastic supp l y curve (S) and a re l atively
inelastic supply curve (S ' ) .

A price change from P to P will result in
1
0

a relatively large change in quantity supplied, from Q to Q , with a
0
2
relatively elastic supply curve.

Conversely, the existence of a rela-

tively inelastic supply function would result in a relatively small
change in quantity supplied, from Q to Q .
1
0
The introduction of a property tax or an i ncreased tax will cause a
l eftward shif t in the demand function.
demanded because of the ta x .

At any price , less will be

This shift should be equal to the present

value of all the future taxes on a given property.
One extreme example of market conditions in the real estate market
i s a completely elastic supply function.

For this example, the shift in

the demand function would not result in any change in price; the total
effect would be accounted for by a reduction in quantity from
in Figure 3.

Q to Q

1

0

In this situation, the property owner is able to s hift the

entire t ax onto the consumers of real estate.
The other ex treme would be a perfectly inelastic supp l y of real
estate.

In this case, the introduction of a property tax or an increased

tax will be comple tel y capitalized into the market value (Figure 4).
7
It shou ld be not ed e l asticities are not constant over time.
th e long run most elasticities are higher than in the short run.

In

16

s

s'

s

Quant ity
Fig . 2 . Price quantities combinat ions for supp l y func t ions havi ng differen t elas t icities.
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D

Quantity

rig. 3 . Price quantity combinations for demand shifts
ass wning perfectly clastic supply.
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s
$

D

D'

Quantity

Fig. 4. Price quantity combinat io ns for demand s hifts
assuming perfectly in e lastic supply.
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Quantity supplied will not change with the total effect of the introduction of a property tax or an increased tax would be accounted for by a
reduction in the market value from P to P .
0
1
Figures 3 and 4 show the two extremes , where supply is either perfectly elastic or inelastic.

Figure 5, however, shows a more realistic

view of actua l market conditions; a supply function that is somewhere
between the two extremes .

No consensus has been reached as to the elas-

ticity of the supply function, but most of empirical work fails to support
the notion of a perfectly elastic or inelastic supply function.
An implicit assumption underlying these hypotheses is a shifting
of the demand func tion.

This assumes a rational individual will offer

l ess for a given land or land/capital parcel by the amount of the present
value of the property tax increase expected to exist for a given number
of years.
For example, the present value (PV) of a tax change can be approximated by:
n

PV

E

t=l
where
n

=

time horizon

time i ndex
discount rate
T =original tax ln do ll ars per year
0
T = new tax in dollars per year.
1

Theoretically, the present value 1;ould be identically equa l to the reducti on in the market price .

20

$

s

D
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Quantity

Fi g. 5. Pri ce quantity combinations for demand shifts
assuming a positive l y sloping suppl y function .

21

Because both the time ho ri zon and implicit discount rate can differ ,
two individuals could have demand sh i f ts of different magnitudes as a
re s1lt of a g iven tax chan ge (Figure 6) .

The time horizon is the length

of : ime the tax is expected to remain unchanged.
var' fTom one i ndividual to t he next.

Thi s expect ation may

Jlowever, more impo rtant in ex plain-

ing differences in individual demand s hifts is the discount rate.
imp icit discount r a te shm;s th e indi v idual' s time preference.

The

For

exa1plc, one individual may be very presen t orien ted--desire a good n ow
rat1 er than in the future--while ano ther individual may have no time
pre'erence for present or future goods and ,;ould thus have a discount
rat• of zero percent.
Another problem in generalizing about capi tali zation effects is
th a· it is necessary to distinguish bet1;een the SUJ1ply and demand for
lan< and the supply and demand for capital (buildings, and oth er i mprovemen ·s) .

Wh en we speak of the supply and demand for real estate 1<ith a

hou.e on it, the supply and demand for land and capital are both present
and indistinguishable.
A third problem is that the short and long run function s may have
di f 'e r e nt elasticities.

In the short run, the supp l y of real es tate is

alm<st perfectly inelastic, but in the long run, the suppl y become > more
ela,tic.

8

With a perfectly inelastic function, capitalization of any

tax is compl e te.

With a more elastic function, there is onl y partia l

cap:tal ization .
However, s hort of a perfectly elastic s uppl y function or no change
in <ema nd (implying irrational land consumers) , any of the above
8
This raises the question of a changing capita li zation over time on
a g.ven property.
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$

D - original demand
function for A
and B

D' - individual A' s
demand function
after increase
D - individual B' s
demand function
after tax increase

s

D
D
D

Quantity
Fig . 6 . Hypothctica 1 demand functio n shifts as a resu l t
of a property tax incrC'ase.

23

hypotheses would indicate at least a partial capitalization of any .
property tax change into market value.
Th esis Objectives
The primary objective of this work is to estimate the extent of
property tax capitalization in one taxing jurisdiction (Logan, Utah)
in 1976.

Logan is a small community

27,000 compared to 22,600 in 1970.

~<ith

a 1976 population of about

Virtually all public services:

water, electricity, police and fire protection, and other social
services are provided by the city, and for the purpose of this study
can be assumed to be equal for all citizens.

Public schools consist of

six elementary, one junior high schoo 1, and one high school, all under

the direction of the Logan Board of Education.
and empirical difficulties associated

~<ith

Some of the theoretical

the use of data from more than

one city have been avoided by concentrating on this one area.

9

Previous tax capitali zation studies are reviewed in Chapter II.

The

next chapter presents the theoretical and empirical model to be used in
this study.

The data and statistical results of the anal ys is are discuss ed

in Chapter IV.
In addition to determining the extent of capitalization,
questions are addressed:

t~<o

related

Is the ratio of assessed valuation to market

price hi ghly variable among parcels?; If so, is the variation systematic?
9A review of the previo us studies and weaknesses in them is covered
in the next chapter, and the model is discussed in Chapter III.
1
°For example, it might be the case th-t the ratio of assessed to
market value is consistently hi gher (101ver) for homes in a particular
price range.

10
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Official ?Olicy is that all properties in this community are to be
assessed at 20 percent of the market value.

The fac t is, the average

ratio of assessed to market value is closer to 13 percent and the variation about this average is substantial .

REVIEW OF LITERATURE
There have been a number of recent studies oif the effect of the
property tax on the market price of real property .

Some have determined

that any property tax is immediately capitalized into lower property
value.

Others have found that the property tax has little or no effect

on the market price of the property.
Among the economic theorists (e . g.,

~lering,

1942), it was generall y

accepted that a property tax on real esta t e was capitalized into lOI<er
real estate values .
~<as

very limited.

HOI<ever, early empirical research on the question
Jens en (1933), in one of t he ear li est studies , found

a sig nificant capitalization effect .

He observed that the net after-tax

rent on farmland was constant at 2.3 percent for his observations in
1919 and in 1924.

He also noted that market price for farmland had fallen

from 1919 to 1924 and that the property taxes had risen during the period .
Critics of the study have pointed out that Jensen failed to control other
factors that 1;ould have an effect on the market price .
this weakness but conte nded that the evidence pointed
tion of the pr operty t ax i nto a

1o~<er

He ackn01dedged
to~<ards

the absorp-

market va lue .

Since the late 1950s, this "estab lish ed" theory has been subjec t to
question.

Daicoff (1961) studied the relationship

bet~<een

property taxes

and property value in rural and urban area~ during 1951-1957 and concluded
that "all tests of th e usually accepted capitalization doctriate produced
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results that

inconsistent with that doctrine ." (Daicoff, p . 112)

~;ere

His expl anation for the se resu lts are that any decrease in market va lue
due to a tax increase is offset by increased va lu e due to corresponding
public expenditure increase .
Orr (1968) investigated the incidence of property taxes on capital
impro vements, by comparing residential rents in 31 communities in the
Bos ton area.

The traditional theory held that property taxes on capital

improvements are shifted onto renters.

One reason for this is the assump-

tion that the supply of capital in housing is perfectly elastic (Figure
7).

Before any property tax on improvements is levied, the market is in

equilibrium

~<i th

rent (R ) and quantity (Q ) .
0
0

As a result of the tax

increase, the demand fu nction (D) is s hifted to the new schedule (0 ' ).
Rent will fall temporari l y to R' , but new inves t ments will be discouraged,
1

and quantity supplied will fal l to Q .
1

At Q , rent net of property taxes
1

will be at R again, and gross rent will be at R .
0
1

This implies full

shifting of the t ax onto consumers.
Orr contended that the supply of capita l is not completely elastic ,
and , correspondingly, the property
~<ith

o~;ner

shares the burden of the tax

the renter as long as the demand function is not perfectly elas tic

(Figure 8) .

The same initial conditions exist with equilibrium rent (R )
0

and quantity (Q ).
0

When t he property t ax is i ncluded, the demand func-

tion falls and th e (gross) rent becomes R .
1

Under these conditions, the

tax caus es the net demand to fall from 0 to 0 ' .

With th is shift, net

rent fa ll s to \ ' and equilibrium is again obtained.

Using Orr ' s assump -

tion of a relatively inel astic supply function, part of the higher tax
is capita li zed immediate l y into l ower real estate values.
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Ro - pretax rent
Qo - pre t ax quantity

Rent per
D~<elling

Rl - posttax rent
Ql - posttax quantity
Rl - posttax rent (short run)

Rl

s

Ro

Rl

~

D

D

D~;elling

Un its

Fig. 7. Change in rent ~<ith a perfectly elastic supply
function for manmade capital.
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Rent per
0\;elling

R - pretax rent
0

Q - pretax quantity

0
R - posttax rent (before
1
demand shift)
R - posttax rent (after
1
demand s hift )
quantity

s

0

o'

Fig. 8. Change in rent with a posi ti ve l y s loping s uppl y
function for manmade capital .
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The empirical analysis supports this hypothesis as Orr found less
than 30 percen t of the tax is shifted from owner to renter.

A weakness

of the study (that Orr admits to) is that it tests the incidence of th e
diffe r ence in tax rates, not the shifting of the total tax.
portion of the tax

~<hich

Thus, the

is common to the enti.re urban area may be borne

by the occupants.
Noodard and Brady (1965 ) evaluated the capitalization of property
tax on farm real estate in Ohio and Indiana in an attempt to establish
"inductive evidence" on the capitali zation theory.

Their approach was

to regress sale price on the present value of the future income stream
and the present value of future taxes.

A weakness of this method is

that it depends upon federal land bank appraisals to determine market
value.

Also, t he future income and taxes must be discounted to present

value.

Thus, an interest rate and t ime hori zo n must be selected which

may or may not be appropriate.

The results of the analysis

~<ere

statis-

tically significant and supported the capitalization hypothesis.
Wicks, Little, and Beck (1968) studied the effects of property tax
changes on the selling price of residential, business, and farm property
in

~li ssoula

County,

~lontana,

during 1965.

They collected data on 1965

taxes, 1964 taxes, 1965 sa l e value, and 1964 assessed value on all properties so l d after the tax change.

For reside ntial property, they found

capitalization ratios of 30:1 , 5:1, and 23:1 depending on the amount of
tax increase.
of 30:1

~<Ould

The hi ghe r r atios are implausible.

A capitalization ratio

mean for every dollar change ·in property tax, there

be a 30-do ll ar change in the selling price.
explanations for such high ratios.

~<Ould

They giv e several possible

First, they suggest possible
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estimation errors in the change of selling price.

The other explanation

could be that the large property tax change <Vas a result of increases in
assessed va lue rather than from yearly rate increases.

A major weakness

of this study is use of the 1964 assessed value as a proxy for the pretax
market value .

Certainly, assessed values and market values for tiVO dif-

ferent dates a r e not comparable.
A similar study
(1970).

~<as

carried out in the San Francisco area by Smith

The objectives were to determine the extent t o l<hich change in

property taxes

~;ere

capitalized into the selling price.

Price 1;as

regressed on diVelling age, change in taxes, and assessed value.

He

found capitalization ratios that ranged from 3.3:1 to 21.6:1 depending
on <Yhether the property

~Vas

sold , 1) before the tax change; 2) after the

change but before the amount of chan ge
of change was

kno~<n .

In this

~<ay ,

the capitalization of th e tax.

~<as

knmm; or 3) after the amount

he was able to observe the change in

It was also observed "that as the tax

increase on a property becomes larger, the fall in th e price of that
property becomes greater" (Smith, p. 192) .
criticized for several rea sons.
the property's market value.

Ho~<ever,

the study can be

Smith uses assessed value as a proxy of

Also the statistica l re sults are only

marginall y significant by the conventional standards.
Predating much of this research

~<ere

several theoretical s tudies on

taxation, expenditure, and consumer preference.

Musgrave (1939) and

Samuelson (1954, 1955) developed models for analyzing consumer preference
for taxes and public goods and the mechanism by which individuals voted.
They argued that IVithout the ability to force the voter to reveal his
preferences, to be able to satisfy these demands, and to tax him
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accordingly, the system will not produce public goods and services at
the optimal level.
Tiebout (1956} contends that this analysis may be accurate for a
central government but not for an analysis of local expenditures.
The consumer- voter may be viewed as picking that community
which best satisfies his preference pattern for public goods.
This is a major difference betl;een central and local provision
of public goods. At the central level the preferences of the
consumer-voter are given, and the government tries to adjust
to the pattern of these preferences .. . The greater the
number of communities and the greater the variance among them,
the closer the consumer will come to fully realizing his
preference position. (Tiebout, p. 418}
Tiebout concludes that given the institutional constraints, the allocation
of pub lic goods and services on the local level is done fair l y efficiently.
Oates (1969} and Hyman and Pasour (1973} test the hypothesis set
forth by Tiebout in empirical models.

Both studies include a test of

the capitalization of the property tax in market value .
53 residential communities in New Jersey .

Oates observed

His model defined property

value as dependent upon a set of physical characteristics of the residences and the area (percentage of families

~<ith

annual income less than

$3,000 , median number of rooms, percentage of houses built since 1950,
and median family income}, proximity to central city , property tax (average of the nominal rate times the assessment ratio} , and public services
(expenditures for education per pupil} .

The study supports the Tiebout

hypothesis and suggests that both public services and property taxes are
capitalized into the market value.

The public services elasticity was

4.9 whi le the property tax elasticity was -3.6.
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Hyman and Pasour (1973) made a similar study of 106 municipalities
in

orth Caro lina.

They concluded that property taxes and public ser-

vices differentials are not

capitali~ed

in market prices either in their

sample area or in most of the United States.

They point out that most

other studies (Orr 1968, Smith 1970, and Oates 1969) looked at urban
areas which are not descriptive of most of the United States.

Hyman and

Pasour contended that the long-run supply of housing in

Carolina

is more elas tic than in the large

~orth

S~~As.

Figure 9 shoi'S the hypothesized supply-demand functions for large
urban areas.

Because of the hi ghly inelastic supply function, a rela-

tively large drop in rent is generated by the change in the property tax.
llol'ever, for the North Carolina property market (Figure 10) the supply
function is assumed more elastic .

With a re l ative l y flatter sup1 ly

function, a given change in the property tax will only cause a small
change in rent .
1)

Three rea so ns are offered for this :

the existence of large quantities of undeveloped land within
close proximity of employment opportunities;

2)

there are relatively fCI< restraints on entering the construction industry; and

3)

the ratio of land value to total residential real estate
va l ue is re l at ive l y

l o~< .

The authors further argue that with this relatively elastic supply curve,
most of any increase i n property taxes

~<ill

be shifted not capita lized.

Their empirical study supports this hypothesis.

The coefficient for

property tax was -4.37 but l'aS not significat at the 0.05 probability
level.

The coefficient on the proxy variable for public services

only 0.21 but

~<as

significantly greater than zero.

~<as
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R - pretax rent
0

Q - pretax quantity
0
R - posttax rent
1

Q - posttax quantity
1

s

D
D

lous1ng Un1t s
Fig. 9. Chan ge in rent with a relatively inelastic
supply function for real estate.
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R - pretax rent

0
Q - pretax quantity
0

Rl - pos t tax rent
Q - post tax quantity
1

s
Ro

~------------------------~~----~~

Rl
D

o'

Housin g Units

Fig. 10 . Change in r ent with a relatively el astic supply
function for real estate .

35

The Hyman-Pasour study has been criticized by Co«ing (1974) for
bein g incomplete, misspecified, and having a significant bias.

Hyman-

Pasour argue that the supply of housing is more elastic in North Carolina
than in the large

S~ISAs .

Ho«ever, it can a.lso be argued th at the demand

for housing is also more clastic .

Smaller communities in North Carolina

are closer s ubstitutes for each other than are the larger

S~ISAs.

Cm;ing's

revised supply-demand functions (Figure 11) shows a more elastic demand
function.

Thus, a change in the property tax

~;ill

larger impact on rent than that sho1m in Figure 10.

have a relatively
COI<ing' s second

criticism of their study is that an interurban effect Has tested while
the Tiebout hypothesis

~<as

aimed at the intraurban effect.

A final crit -

icism is that the Hyman-Pasour study excl ud ed the nin e largest cities in
North Carolina from the sampled communities .
results.
ut ed

~;ith

This . exc lu sion bia ses the

These excluded observations are probably not randomly distribrespect to several, if not all , of the independent variables

(Figure 12).

The relationship llyman and Pasour found (R) would have a

significant bias if the excluded observations are nonrandom.
relationship

(R ' )

~;auld

The revised

shm< the true relations hip for a correctly

specified model, because Cmdng contends the highest property tax rates
and t he hi gh est levels of public services are found in the largest cities
of the state.
In one of the most recent studies,

~'ic~lillan

and Car l son (1977) found

no evidence of the capitalization of property tax and public services
into the market price.
Hyman-Pasour
this case.

~<ork .

The

This study is essentially an extension of the

The criticisms that Cowing offered also hold for

~lc~lillan-Carlson

study was focused on a number of small
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Ro - pretax rent
Qo - pretax quanti t y
Rl - post tax rent
Ql - post tax quantity

s

D

D

Housi ng Units

Fig . 11. Rent quantity combinations for changing demand
and r elativel y e las tic supp l y function .
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Flg . 12.

Cowing ' s hypothesized data relationship.
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cities in Wisconsin .

T1;o-stage l east-square techniques

~·ere

used to

regress market val ue on median number of r ooms, percentage of homes built
since 1950, median famil y income, percentage of families below the official poverty

l evel , percentage of homes owner- occupied, distance to a

l arge metropolitan area, fu ll -val ue local property tax rate, school
operating expenditures per pupi l , and nonschoo l expenditures per capita.
The authors explain th e absence of capita l izat i on eff ec t in their study
as a result of a relatively elastic supp l y of land and capital functions.
They do admit , however, th at the supply of land i n t he l arger urban areas
could be relatively inelastic and , thus, absor ption of any property tax
a nd public service into th e market price is possible .
Another aspec t of property tax that has come und er cl ose scrutiny is
t he administration of the t ax .

Questions have bee n raised about assess-

ment i nequities, tax regressi veness, a nd r esource misallocation.

~lo st

of

the work done concerning the ad minis trati ve aspect, however, have been
theoretica l studies with very litt l e empirical backing .
Lynn (1969) , Ladd (1973), Johnson (1969) , and Rasmussen (1959) all
present refor ms that they argue are needed t o correct t h e inequities and
allocation problems of th e property tax.

All cited assessment problems

as a major weakness in th e prop erty t ax sys tem.
Black ( 1972) made a study of property tax rat e vari a t ion in the ci t y
of Bosto n for the years 1950 and 1960.

Usi ng a samp le size of 18 ,000

individual residential properties, he tested the hypothesis that variations
in the ratio of assessed to market value

~< ere

not random but systematic .

Black regressed asses sed to market va l ue ratio on racia l mix , exten t of
deterioration in the area, income l eve l, property va lue , and number of
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families per s tructure .

He found a positive relationship between that

ratio and number of families per structure, density of nom;hite population, and amount of deterioration in the area.

He also found a negative

relationship between the ra1:io and family income and property value .

ln

summary, property owned by lm<er income individuals was assessed a t a
hi gher percentage of market value than
families.

~<as

proper1:y owned by higher income

Black concludes tha1: "the proper1:y tax , as it is administered

in Boston, has resulted in substan1:ia l inequality in effective tax ra1:es"
(Black, p. 209).

He suggests that assessment values be a uniform frac-

tion of market value, centralized control over 1:he assessment process,
improved methods of determining market value, and increasing the frequency of assessments are all measures that are needed.
This chapter has reviewed the important studies of the impact
of th e property tax on market value.

Some found that increased property

taxes were capitalized into market values; others did not.
studies, hm;ever, suffered from some
us ed .

~<eakness,

All the

primarilr in the data

The studies that tested the Tiebout hypothesis used percentages,

median, and average data to compare communities .

This assumes that

variation 1;ithin a community is nonexistent or minimal, when in actua l ity ,
the i ntracommuni ty variat ion may be greater than the in1:ercommunity
variation.

Other problems include :

use of assessed value as a proxy for

selli ng price; comparing different communities or cities (thus different
public services); comparing different time periods; not compensating for
other reasons for price changes; nonrandom data or deletion of nonrandom
data; discounting t o present value (1:hus, need to establish an interest
r ate and a time horizon); and using market price

~<ithout

compensating for
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already existing capitalization (thus, testing a distorted change in
capitalization not full capitalization effect).

Any one of these pro-

blems could distort the results of an empirical s t udy.
The follm;in g study overcomes most, if not all, of these problems.

Data

used is for individual properties sold within one community for the year
1976.

All properties within the community were reassessed in 1975, thus,

there is no problem with assessments made at different times.

There is

no significant variation in public services in this community.

It may

be argued that there are random neighborhood variations in public services, however, any variation ought to be minimal since all households
receive their public services from one sourcc.

11

Finally, due to the

nature of the empirical model, the capitalization effect is netted out
of the market pTice , leaving the " true " market val ue.

Discounti ng is not

necessary, thus, there i s no need to pick an interest rate or the relevant time horizon.

The model used is outlined in the follOI<ing chapter.

llFor example, all students attend the same junior high school and
high school.

THE

~IODEL

Theoretically , the capitalization effect (C) is the sum of the discounted differentials between the actual tax fo r each period (Til and
the "true" tax (T:) or th at based on the real market value

(~() .

That

is,

T.* - T.
1
1

n

c

E

( I)

(l+r) i

i =l

"here r is the appropriate discoun t rate and n is th e hor izon or len gth
of time t hat buyers expect t h e differenti a l t o be maintained .

The empir -

ical problem is that of all th e variab l es in the equation, only th e
actua I tax level (T i) is observable.

The "true " tax i s a 1 in ear function

of the "true" market va lue of the property, but the latter is not
directly observab le because observed market prices includ e the capit a l i zation effect .

It is possible, ho1;ever , to set up a system of simulta -

neous equations and u se indirect l eas t squares to estimate the capita li zation effect.
Con s ider the followin g system .

Th e observed market va l ue price (M)

is id entica ll y equa l to the "true " market va lue

(~1

* ) p l us the capitaliza-

t ion effect,

~1

~~

*

+

c

(2)
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TI1e capitalization effect is given by equation (1) but r educes to

c

(T * - T

0

0

n

E

)

.

i=l (l +r)

1

if the "true" and actual tax levels are constant over time .

Setting

we have the linear function

c

(3)

Not< the "tru e " tax is determined as the product of t h e mi 11 l evy (JJ) ,
the ratio of assessed to market valuation (6) , a nd the "true " market

price, i . e. ,
T

*

110~1

*

( 4)

Finally, the "true" market price is assumed to be a linear function of
characteristics of t he property itself independent of any capitalization
effect,

~1

*

(5)

~;here

xl' ... ' xp represent those physical or aesthetic characteristics

~<hich

include:

age of structure, square feet of structure, and a dummy

variable, quality of neighborhood.

12

12

selection of t h ese ch aracteristics is discussed i n t he next
chapter.

43

The basic structural system consists o f four equations (2) - (5) in
four endogenous variables ,

T,

x1 , ... , xP.

~1,

C, T * , and

~1

* , and P + l exo genous variables

This set of variables can be cross - classified in the

follo1dng way:
Exogenous
T ,X , ... , X
1

Observable
Nonobservab le

Although three endogenous variables are not observable, the paramete r s of equations (3), (4), and (5) can be estimated using the indirect
l east-square technique .
tuting (3),

Derive a single reduced form equation by substi -

(4), a nd (5) into (2) which yields
(6)

where

Yo

bso (l+b3l~oJ,

rl

bs1 Cl+b3l~ o J,

Because equation (6) has only one endogenous variable, the variables on
the right ha nd side and the error term will be indep e ndent, and the
function can be estimated using the ordinary leas t - squares method.
Having estimated y , y , . . . , yp' and b , and knowing the values of the
31
0
1
parame ters

~

and 6 , the other parameters can be det ermined as:
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bSj

y/(l+b

31 ~o).

bso

Yo1 ( l +b3l~o)

j= l, .. . , p
·

Once these parameters are obtained, t he "true " market
prop erty tax , and capitalization effect can be determined .

price~

"true 11

The data a nd

results from the mode l are discussed in th e following chapter .

1<10DEL ESTHIA TION
Data
The data used t o estimate the parameters of the model are based on
sales data for 107 residential propertie s in Lo gan , Utah during 1976.
Sales prices and detailed property characteris ti cs are reported for each
in booklets published by the multiple listing service tha t is adminis tered jointly by almost all local real estate firms.
each parcel

~<ere

13

Tax data for

obtained from the county assessor's office .

characteristics ,;ere det:ermined by direct observation .
neighborhood quality,

vie~<,

Some

These inc luded

a nd quality of landscaping .

The speci fie data eventually used in th e model "as a result of both
intuitive logic and empirical test result:s.

The characteristics, age,

square feet of s tructure, quality of neighborhood, and pr operty tax,

~<ith

the exception of quali t y of neighborhood, all are statistical l y significant at the 0.025 significance level.

It is submit t ed that differences

in these four c harac t eris tic s s hould adequately exp lain differences i n
se llin g price.

Age of structure serves as a proxy for qualit y (and quite

often construction material); size characteristics such as number of

13
This data ,;as taken from the Logan ~tulti ple Listing Exchange,
Sold Properties Listing for each of the four quarters in 19 76.
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rooms, bathrooms, bedrooms largely are captured by the number of square
feet in the structure .

The quality of neighborhood variables is based on

the author ' s judgement of different parts of the community.

Finally,

prop ert y tax enters the model to allow estimation of the net capitali zation.

In a ddition, to the above parameters, the market quarter sold was
used in some of the regressions to identify market cycles and conditions
in the

real estate market.

Th ese market conditions are important to the

anal ysis of capitalization of th e property tax into the market pric e .
As id en tified in Chapter I, tax capitalization is depend ent on the demand
and supply elasticities; and these elasticities are an empirical measurement of

the mark et conditions.

In the short run, if th e real estate

mark et is charact erized by excess supply of the going price, the supply
should be relative ly inelastic, and capitalization of the property tax
into the market value will be extensive, if not complete.

Actually, the

use of th ese dummy variables did not materially affect the estimated
2
coefficients on the tax variable nor the equational statistics, R and F.
How ever , it is th e opinion of local real estate experts that during this
peri od the market was oversupplied.

The short time span covered by the

study may be the reason that no empirical evidence was generated.
Statistical Result s --The Capitali za tion Effect
The least-squares regressions were run using natural log and results
report ed in log form.

Using lo g form makes sense for age of structure,

square feet of structure, and property tax, since it is not expected the

17

1

m~lr}..et

V<'llue t o be linear with respect to the absol ute value of these

. a b l es . 11\

\ "i1 rJ

Table 7 shoh'S t he regress i on col!fficients a ntl stat i stical results
for the fou t· estimatcu equations .

Equation I regressed market price on

a constan t term, age of structure, square feet i n structure, quality of
neighborhood , and property tax .

Market value was regressed on market

qu:ntcr S<? ld, age o f st r ucture , square fl:et in s t ructure , quality of
neighbo r hood, and property tax in equation II.

The third equation re-

gressecl ma r ket value on a constan t term, age of structure, age of structur e sq uar ed, square fee t in structure , quality of neighborhood, and
property tax .

Equation IV regressed market price on market quarter sold,

age of s t ructure, age of structure squared, square feet in structur e,
quality

o~

neighborhood , and property tax .

In all cases the coefficients

had the corr ect ·signs under the null hypothesis ; a l l but quality of
neighborhood · are s tati s tically significant using conventional standards .
The pr operty t ax vari able was found to have a significant negative
re l ati ons hip, 1-.r i th m?-rket va l ue .

The coe fficicn t s for proper ty tax,

in t erp r et ed as elasticit ies, ranged from - 0.4159 t o -0.4539 and are significan tl y

diffe~ent

from zero at the 0. 005 probabi lity level . These elastici-

ties can be interpre t ed as

percen~

changes .

A one - percent change in the

propert y tax will result in a 0 . 4 percent change in market value .
·~

For

example , i: f an owner of a $50 ,000 house who p:1ys $2,000 in property
t axes has his t axes increased by one percent· ($?0), the market value of
tha t house h'Ould decrease by $200 or 0 . ·+ percent .
14
.
r:or ex~l mplc, the greater the square feet, the smaller 1\0Uld be the
expected iwpac't on the market va l ue of a given absolute ch ange in the
square fee t of the structure .

TAB LE 7 .- - Regress i on Coeffjc i en t s a nd Sta t ist i ca l Resu l ts from Equation 6
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Findings on Assessment Variation
The secondary object ive of this thesis is to determine i f there is
significant variation in assess ed to market value ratios and i f that
variation is systema tic.

This htas done in several ways.

value wa s regressed on market value.
in Table 8 .

First, assessed

Th e estimated equation is reported

The coefficient on market price of 0.1264 and a nons ignifi-

cant con stant term suggest that the expected assessed to mark et value
rat io for any randomly se l ec ted parcel would be 12.6 percent, not 20
percent as argued by local offici a ls.
2

The coefficient of determination

(R ) is 0 . 65 and the F- sta tisti c is 195 .2 .

A scatter diagram showing th e

relations hip of actual assessments to actual market va l ue is given in
Graph 1.

TABLE B.--Regr essio n Coefficients and Statistical Results

Dependent
Variable

Constan t

Valu e

Assessed
value

-133. 2
(- 0.36)

0. 1264

R-Squared

F-Statistic

Sta ndard
Error

0.65

195. 2

11 34.29

~larket

Number of
Observations
10 7

(13 . 97)

The second objective, t esting for any indications of systematic
var i ation, was comp leted by regressing assessed va lue on a mark e t price
by propert y value group .
as:

These prop erty value groups were broken down

0 to $30,000 ; $30,000 to $40,000; $40,000 to $50,000; and $50,000

and above.

To det ermine the variation within a gi ven group, the standard

error of the regr ess ion, R-squar ed , and F- s tati s tic for the regre ssions

so

.
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have been computed .
t~<een

To compare the assessed to market value ratio be-

groups the slope and intercept of each bes t fit least squares line

for the regressions have been compared.

As previously determined, the

assessed to market va l ue ratio for the best fit least squares l ine for
all observations is approximately 12 . 6 percent .
of

vie~< ,

From an equ it y po int

any structures assessed at l ess than 12.6 percent

~;oulu

underassessed, and any sl:ructures assessed at over 12. 6 percent
overassessed .
acceptable, but

be
~<Ould

be

Of course, minor deviations from l:his average are not only
e~~ected.

Table 9 giv es the regression coefficients and sl:atistical results
from the four regressions by group.

From the regression result s , l:he

coefficie nt of determ i natio n for the seco nd group, $30,000 to $40,000,
~<as

0.67, indicating extreme varlal:ion

~;ithin

tha t . group.

The inl:ragroup

variation in the assessed to mark et value ratio ranged from 8.8 percenl:
in the second group to a hi gh of 14.6 percent in the third and fourth
categori es.
Graphs 2, 3, 4, and 5 are scatter dia grams
assessmenl: by markel: value group.

sho~<ing

From these di agrams it is noted the

l ack of variation i n t he 0-$30,000 group i n compari son
groups .

the variation in

~<ith

the other

Sl:atist i ca ll y th is can be noted from l:h e hi gher R-squared,

higher F-sta t isti c, and

l o~;er

standard error of t he r egr essio n (Tab l e 9)

for 1:he first group t han the other groups .

Along with havin g the lowesl:

intra group variation , the 0-$30,000 group's best fit least squares line
has a slope of about 12.9 percent

~<hi ch

is closest among the various

groups to the slope of the best fit least squares line for all observation s .

TABLE 9. --Re gress ion Coefficients and St atis ti ca l Res ult s

~·larket

Value

Ma rket

RSquared

Statistic

0 .1 289
( 4. 50)

0.4904

20 . 2088

1172.14
(0. 56)

0 .0878
(l. 4 7)

0.0670

Assessed
value

-698. 72
( -0. 28)

0. 14 60
(2.62 )

Assessed
value

-1 47 0.26
(-0.28)

0 .1 460
( l. 55 )

Dep endent
Variable

Constant

Pric 0

0-$30. 000

Assessed
value

-272.51
(-0 . 41)

$30.000-$40 ,0 00

Assessed
value

$40 , 000-$50,000
$50,000-above

Group

F-

Standard
Error

Number of
Observations

708 . 111

23

2. 15566

975 . 699

32

0. 2030

6.87588

995 . 899

29

0. 1030

2 . 41116

1746.18

23
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The $30,000 to $4 0 , 000 group is by far the most underassessed group .
Tts 8.8 percent assessed to

m~rke

va l ue ratio is almost four percen t

less than the ratio for all observa t ions.
most intragroup var iations.

The second group a l so has the

This variation is apparent from its R- square,

which is only 0 . 0670 , and from the scat t er diagram (Graph 3).
The last t1w groups, $40,000 to $50,000 and $50,000 and above have
assessed to market value rJtios that are l<ell above the ratio for all
observations.

These properties are being overassessed by abo ut t"o

perce nt age points .

15

The int ragroup variation i s extensive, especiall y

in th e $50,000 a nd above group .
The intergroup variation of the bes t fit l east-s qua re s lines may
seem insi gni ficant; however , as Tab! e 10 s ha ws, the se sma ll percentage
differences result in large ta x differences.

These dat a demo ns trat e the

variation in annual bas e for a gi ven va lu ed property dependi ng on what
assessed to marke t value ratio is used .

The tax is computed using t he

1976 mi ll l evy for Logan City (60 .97 mills).

Differences in th e t axes due to variations in th e as sessed to marke t va l ue ratios are, in most cases, more important t ha n differences in
the market value.

For example, the tax difference between a $35,000

house assesse d a t 8 . 8 percent as compared to 14 . 6 percent is $123.77,
while a $35 ,000 house ass essed at 8.8 peTccnt would onl y have a $107 . 30
t ax difference from a $55 , 000 house assessed at 8 .8 percent.

15

Far example, a $50,000 house in th is situation would be overas s ess ed by $1,000. In 19 76 , thi s ~;ould have resu lt ed i n overtaxing
t he ow ner by $60 . 97.
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TABLE 10.--Property Tax Resulting from Variations in Assessed to Harket
~larket Value Ratios for Different Valued Properties
Assessed to

~larket

Value

~!arket

12.6%

12. 9'o

8.8%

$25,000

$192 . 06

$196 . 63

$35,000

$268 . 88

$45,000

Value Ratio
14.6%

20%

$134 . 13

$222.54

$304 . 85

$275 . 28

$187 . 79

$311.56

$426.79

$345.70

$353.93

$241.44

$400.57

$548 . 73

$55' 000

$422.52

$432 . 58

$295 . 09

$489.59

$670 . 67

$65,000

$499. 34

$511.23

$348. 75

$578 . 61

$792.61

Sill<~IARY

AND CONCLUSION

In Chapter I, the property tax

~<as

revie~<ed

"ith special emphasis

on the criticisms and advocated reforms of the tax.
~<as

One of these reforms

the professiona li zing of the assessment process.

This study, although

directed towards capturing the capitalization effect, has as a secondary
objective the measurement of variation in the assessed t o market value
ratios for real estate in the area studied.
ti ve, a statistical model was utilized.

In accomplishing this objec-

This process not on l y identified

inequities in the assessmen t process, but demonstrated the feasibility
of computerizing the assessment process.

By simply knowing the age of

the structure , square feet of the structure, quality of the nei ghborhood,
and the property tax, the· property value can be assessed quickly and
consistently.

This process of assessment may be more effic ient, equitable,

and accurate than the procedure of having an assessor evaluate particular
sites on an ad hoc basis.
The theories underlying the incidence of the property tax are also
discus sed in Chapt er I.

1\;o extreme examples

~<ere

di scusse d:

one, that

any tax is completely capitalized into a lm<er market value; and two,
th at the burden of the tax is almost compl etely shifted onto the con sumer.

In evaluating the extent of capitalization in th e market, the

elasticity of th e supply function is the determining factor.

The example

that s ugges ts complete capitali zatio n is based on th e assumption of a
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perfectly inelastic supply function for real estate .

The assumption of

an elastic supply function must be made to fulfill the shifting example.
The primary objective of this study was to empirically estimate the
incidence of the propert y tax (i.e., the extent to wh ich it is capitalized) .
As discussed in Chapter II, there has been no consensus among the previous
empiircal studies on the incidence of the tax .

In addition, many weak-

ness es were found in these models and the data used .

In most cases,

thes e weaknesses biased the results obtained.
The model presented in Chapter III is unique in that it eliminated
the problems encountered in previous studies.

The data set, discussed in

Chapter I V, is also unique in that it is for one year in one community.
All properties within this community were reassessed the previous year.
Another feature of the data set is that all characteristics were for
individual properties not gross averages and percentages.
The es timated equations, also presented in Chapter IV, identify
significant capitalization coefficients .
- 0.4159 to -0.4 539.

These coefficients ranged from

These findings support the hypothesis that th e sup -

ply function for rea l estate is quite inelastic and the burden of the
tax is reflected in loh•er selling prices.

This fact has policy implica -

tions in that an mmer of real estate may rece i ve "w indfall " gains or
l osses due to tax changes .

These gains and losses will be greater than

just the immediate change in the tax burden but will also includ e changes
in the market value of the pi ece of property.
An area sui tab l e for further research would be the equity and effi ciency questions of the property tax itself.

It might be useful to look

at the equity and efficiency effects of a sliding scale on the mill l evy

61

or assessment to market value ratio depending on market value or income
level .

These and other issues related to the practical application of

assessment methods and the tax itself need fur t her study .

Since the

property tax is the " cornerstone" fo1· all local fiscal opera t ions , any
improvement in equity or efficiency would be socially desirable.
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